Rejoinder: Advances in the Analysis

MARSHALL S. SHAPO

As I note in my Article in this Symposium, the Reporters' Study
on personal injury law is grand in its ambition.
In the service of that enterprise, the contribution to the Symposium by Professors Abraham, Rabin, and Weiler furthers our understanding of a group of knotty problems in the realm of injury law.
Not the least of their contributions is their assault on the medical
malpractice problem,1 which in conjunction with other scholarship
led by Professor Weiler 2 appears to be a genuine advance in the discussion of legal policy.
This brief rejoinder addresses two levels of issues-broad questions involved in the effort to establish a critical overview of injury
law and questions more precisely bound up with products liability
law. One lesson of this essay is something that a distinguished social
scientist taught me at the outset of my career: in the social sciences,
we learn basic truths over and over again.
I. GLOBAL ANALYSES

In the last decade, there have been two global analyses of society's
responses to the injury problem. These are my initial effort in 1984,
as Reporter for the Special Committee on the Tort Liability System
of the American Bar Association (A.B.A.),3 and the American Law
1. Kenneth S. Abraham et al., EnterpriseResponsibility for PersonalInjury: Further Reflections, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 333, 355-58 (1993).
2. See PAUL C. WEILER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ON TRIAL (1991); PATIENTS,
DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENTS'

COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (Report of the Harvard Medical Practice Study to the
State of New York 1990).

3. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N SPECIAL COMM'N ON THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM, ToWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF
SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW (1984) [hereinafter A.B.A. REPORT].

Institute Enterprise Liability Report in 1991. 4 It may be that their
congruences are more noteworthy than their differences in points of
view.
Perhaps the most significant parallel between the two Reports is
their scope of inquiry. The A.B.A. Report, entitled Towards a Jurisprudence of Injury, seeks to "define tort law as a major feature of a
developing jurisprudence of injury in our country." 5 The study devotes a chapter of nearly two hundred pages to neighboring systems
of law through which society seeks to avoid, or to resolve, conflicts
about injury.6 This approach built on my recognition in 1970 of "the
public complications of private lawsuits and judicial decisionmaking" and on my 1976 casebook, entitled Tort and Compensation
Law." The ALI Study essays a "serious scholarly analysis and reflection about the tort system and related institutions for dealing with
disabling injuries."
Both works stress that whatever needs exist for repair in the tort
system go far beyond doctrine. The A.B.A. Report, though analyzing
many of the discrete controversies about doctrine and damages rules
that have engaged scholars for years, focuses many of its key recommendations on improvement of the process of data gathering and dispute resolution. 10 The ALl Study occupies itself in significant part
with institutional analysis,' and with "develop[ing] a number of ap12
proaches to legal and institutional reform."
Both this author and the writers of the ALI Study appear to agree
on the misleading features of the public relations barrage that has
been launched against the civil justice system as it applies to personal injuries.13 Some disagreement exists about quasi-substantive
rules of law crucial to the amount of money that changes hands in
tort suits, but there appears to be a congruence of thought on the
scholarly background of that disagreement.
The A.B.A. Report analyzed, in some detail, the criticisms of tort
damages on the grounds that they lack "'coherent principle,' 114 and
4.

AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
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See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 3, at ch. 13.
The titles of its two volumes are The InstitutionalFrameworkand Approaches

to Legal and Institutional Change.
12. 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 4, at 580.
13. See Abraham et al., supra note 1, at 334; Marshall S. Shapo, Bashing the
Law, 65 N.Y. ST. B. J. No. 3, at 46 (March-April 1993).
14. See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 3, at 5-164 (quoting Beverley M. McLachlin,
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spoke of "the difficulties of fixing a philosophical base for tort damages, particularly for personal injuries."' 15
The ALl Study focuses on discrete issues of damages. Concerning
one of the most discussed of those issues, it agrees with the A.B.A.
Report on the desirability of retaining pain and suffering as an item
of tort awards.1 6 It also presents interesting ruminations on ways to
establish limits to that item, which strains the rational structure of
damages arithmetic.' 7
In both the ALI Study and their article, 8 the authors reflect the
tensions concerning the collateral sources rule that manifested themselves in the discussions of the A.B.A. Committee. I can testify that
this was one of the two or three subjects that produced the most
contentiousness in that committee. I personally continue to find the
question a very difficult one. I do note, in particular, that no one has
satisfactorily explained why life insurance is not a "collateral
source" for purposes of the argument against retention of collateral
sources.
Perhaps the major difference between the ALl Study and my
views of the subject is that the Study insufficiently deals with the
"Problem of the Missing Tsar": the persistent (and fortunate) resistance of the American polity to the idea that we should endow one
institution with comprehensive power to "assign" injury law tasks to
various decisionmaking systems.' 9
II. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
I turn now to the particular subject of products liability.
I seem to detect a certain puckishness in the ALI authors' lament
that there was "so much emphasis . . . on products liability law in
this symposium[,] with much of Jerry Phillips' and all of Marshall
Shapo's contributions chastising us for presuming to tamper with
what they ' 20consider to be the fully[ ]enlightened judicial product in
this area."
What Price Disability? A Perspective on the Law of Damagesfor Personal Injury, 59
CAN. B. REV. 1, 1 (1981)).
15. See id. at 5-165.
16. See id. at 5-176 to 5-183; 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 4, at 229.
17. See 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 4, at 217-29.
18. Compare 2 ALI STUDY, supra note 4, at 161-82 with Abraham et al., supra
note 1, at 340-42.
19. See Marshall S. Shapo, Tort Reform: The Problem of the Missing Tsar, 19
HOFSTRA L. REV. 185 (1990).
20. Abraham et al., supra note 1, at 348.

I have explained in my Article why I, at least, chose to focus on
that subject. I was writing an article responding to a book, rather
than writing another book. Products liability is a subject I know in
detail, and it is one, that as the ALI authors themselves point out in
their present essay, to which they chose to "devote[] a full chapter. ' '21 Moreover, in a report so powerful and filled with good ideas,
the products chapter seemed curiously unpersuasive.
I venture a few comments, staccato:
- Our competing recitations and criticisms of the ALl Study's
short history of products liability stand on their own, and the reader
must choose what seems the fuller and more satisfactory treatment.2 2
- The ALI authors' sally about "presuming to tamper with ...
the fully enlightened judicial product" 23 is surely wry. My products
liability treatise, now more than two volumes,24 as well as two
coursebooks, 25 reflect one observer's attempt at detailed criticism of
doctrine, as well as an attempt to explore its underlying roots. A
monograph recently published 26 extends that effort. Thus, I assume
that with their reference to my presumed support for "the fully enlightened judicial product," the authors indulge a light-hearted
penchant for the lugubrious. This is doubtless also the case with
their reference to my presumed opposition
to "refinements and reser27
vations" in products liability law.
Indeed, in some cases where the ALI authors seem to insist that
there is disagreement, there appears to be a basic agreement on refinements and distinctions. Scholars generally, as well as courts generally, have recognized the "variety of defective product claims" and
the fact that as a practical matter, there is often a working distinction between "manufacturing defects" and "design defects. ' ' 28
Yet, as Professor Phillips points out, 29 and as I have independently

21. Id. at 347.
22. Compare Marshall S. Shapo, An ALl Report Markets a Defective Product:
Errors at Retail and Wholesale, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 221 (1993), with Abraham et
al., supra note 1, at 333.
23. Abraham et al., supra note 1, at 348.
24. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (2d ed. 1990 &
Supps. 1991, 1992, 1993).
25. W. PAGE KEETON & MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRODUCTS AND THE CONSUMER:
DEFECTIVE & DANGEROUS PRODUCTS (1970) (with an opening section of 422 pages on

public regulation reflecting an early concern with comparative institutional analysis);
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES AND MATERIALS (1980). See also
MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PUBLIC REGULATION OF DANGEROUS PRODUCTS (1980).
26. MARSHALL S. SHAPO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE

(1993).
27. Abraham et al., supra note 1, at 348.
28. See id. at 348-49.
29. Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Reporters' Study of Enterprise Responsibility for PersonalInjury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 241, 244 (1993).
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noted, "there is a substantial area of overlap between the concepts."' 30 Indeed, in Barker v. Lull EngineeringCorp.,3 ' on which the
ALI authors place a certain emphasis,3 2 the court stresses that in
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,33 it had "refute[d] any such
distinction." 34
Another area of agreement on important issues in products liability involves the crashworthiness conundrum. I have invited my stu35
dents to wrestle with this problem for almost a quarter century,
and indeed my second casebook plays off the two cases on which the
ALI authors focus.3 6
The authors' description of the Barker case "as a classic 'misuse'
situation" 37 illustrates how the criticism of doctrine, and the effort to
probe beneath seemingly solvent language, can improve analysis. I
explain in some detail in my treatise that it would, on the whole,
improve the law if the courts stopped using a separate "misuse"
defense. 38
The question of whether "consumer expectations" should be a separate element of the defect test is an important one. The notion admittedly has some artificiality. I only express the concern that an
effort to bundle "expectations" into the construct of "risk/utility"
may produce a double layering of artificiality that usually will not
yield analytical gains.
It is important to note an area of overlap, if not total agreement,
on a basic idea. The ALI authors observe that "the doctrinal side of
products liability law is not the most salient dimension of our proposals." 39 Nor is the doctrinal side of products liability law what most
30. SHAPO, supra note 24, 1 8.01, at 8-3.
31. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
32. See Abraham et al., supra note 1, at 349-50.
33. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972), to which the authors
refer in Abraham et al., supra note 1, at 348-49.
34. Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 417, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228. See also
Coy v. Simpson Marine Safety Equip., Inc., 787 F.2d 19 (1st Cir. 1986), summarized in
8.01, at 8-4 n.6.
SHAPO, 1 THE LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY, supra note 24,
35. KEETON & SHAPo, supra note 25, at 824-58; SHAPO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY:
CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 25, at 149-61 (excerpting Self v. General Motors
Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575 (1974), and Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974)).
36. See SHAPO, PRODUCTS LIABILITY: CASES AND MATERIALS, supra note 25, at
149-61 (excerpting Self v. General Motors, 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575
(1974), and Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974)).

37. Abraham et al., supra note 1, at 349.
38. See, e.g., SHAPo, 2 THE LAW OF PRODUCTS
§ 21.08[6].
39. Abraham et al., supra note 1, at 352.

LIABILITY,

supra note 24,

needs fixing about the process of products litigation, or tort litigation
generally.
III.

FRAMING AN ACHIEVEMENT

The stakes are high in the sprawling territory of the law of injuries. Yet, as the ALl authors specifically suggest about medical malpractice, the stakes are incomparably higher in the larger areas of
policy that surround the law. Robert Reischauer, the director of the
Congressional budget office, recently provided a poignant example in
the medical area. He asserted that efforts to control health care costs
would probably "requir[e] consumers to accept some real limits on
the quality or quantity of medical care." Of special relevance to our
present inquiry was his statement that changes in malpractice laws,
as well as managed care and elimination of red tape, would produce
"only modest savings." 40
It is fitting to conclude with a reference to the ALI authors' complaint that the Institute gave insufficient consideration to their proposals.4 1 This observer would interpret the fate of the Study
differently. Its drafts were, in fact, the subject of spirited if brief
discussion from the inception of the project. The final product was
the topic of particularly intense debate.
The politics of national lawyers' organizations is a fascinating
study in itself. This writer could provide relevant anecdotal experiences concerning the history of his own tort study within the American Bar Association, and the minutes of the A.L.I. would yield an
instructive chronicle of the competition of ideas in the context of organizational culture.
But those histories await analysis. For the moment, the Reporters
not only should be proud of their intellectual achievement, but
pleased with what it has accomplished: It has become an important
part of a national debate about legal policy. What more could a
schoolteacher ask?

40. Less Health Care Seen as Possible, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 3, 1993, at A10 (quoting and paraphrasing Robert D. Reischauer).
41. Abraham et al., supra note 1, at 333.

